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Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than
the average financial institution; (ii) consumers of some of the largest financial services providers,
including Wells Fargo, American Express (“Amex”), and Bank of America, were significantly
more likely than the average consumer to dispute the provider’s response to their initial complaints;
and (iii) among the companies included in the database that provide mortgages, OneWest Bank,
HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all received more mortgage complaints rela-
tive to mortgages sold than other mortgage providers. In addition, regression analysis suggests that
consumer financial companies respond differently to complaints, depending on the type of prod-
uct and issues involved, thereby generating significant differences in the timeliness of responses
and whether consumers dispute those responses. Moreover, demographics matter: mortgage com-
plaints per mortgage significantly increased in ZIP codes with larger proportions of certain pop-
ulations, including Blacks and Hispanics. Companies were also less timely, and more likely to
have their responses disputed, in areas with higher concentrations of senior citizens and college
students, groups on which the CFPB is mandated to focus.
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ABSTRACT  
Analyzing a new dataset of 110,000 consumer complaints lodged 
with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB” or the 
“Bureau”), the authors find that: (i) Bank of America, Citibank, and 
PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer 
complaints than the average financial institution; (ii) consumers of 
some of the largest financial services providers, including Wells 
Fargo, American Express (“Amex”), and Bank of America, were 
significantly more likely than the average consumer to dispute the 
provider’s response to their initial complaints; and (iii) among the 
companies included in the database that provide mortgages, 
OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America 
all received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold 
than other mortgage providers.  In addition, regression analysis 
suggests that consumer financial companies respond differently to 
complaints, depending on the type of product and issues involved, 
thereby generating significant differences in the timeliness of 
responses and whether consumers dispute those responses.  
Moreover, demographics matter: mortgage complaints per mortgage 
significantly increased in ZIP codes with larger proportions of 
certain populations, including Blacks and Hispanics.  Companies 
were also less timely, and more likely to have their responses 
disputed, in areas with higher concentrations of senior citizens and 
college students, groups on which the CFPB is mandated to focus. 
                                                                                                                                         
* Participants in Yale Law School’s Empirical Law and Economics seminar and Nancy 
Welsh provided helpful comments.  Ian Ayres has served as an economic expert for 
proposed plaintiff classes in several cases relating in part to alleged untimely decision-
making regarding permanent mortgage modifications under the Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in 2011, the CFPB has enabled consumers to 
submit complaints about “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” 
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by financial services companies.  The purpose of this complaint process, 
required under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act1 (“Dodd-Frank”) is threefold: (1) to assist individual 
consumers with specific complaints; (2) to focus the Bureau’s 
enforcement and regulatory efforts on specific companies and general 
“business practices that may pose risks to consumers” based on 
aggregate consumer concerns; and (3) by making the data publicly 
available, to provide the financial services industry with a high-level 
view of what matters to consumers and to provide consumers with a 
view into how companies are meeting those needs.2  The raw complaint 
data is updated nightly and available to download from the Bureau’s 
website.3  Although the CFPB analyzes some of the data internally for 
its semiannual reports to Congress, the Bureau encourages “the public, 
including consumers, the companies that serve them, analysts, data 
scientists, civic hackers, developers, policymakers, journalists, and 
academics, to analyze, augment, and build on the public database” as 
well.4 
The analysis that follows is in keeping with that request.  The 
authors of this Article have assessed the approximately 110,000 
complaints included in the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database (the 
“Database”) as of June 3, 2013.  The results indicate that in the 
aggregate, these complaints provide a veritable treasure trove of data for 
assessing the work of the Bureau and the companies under its watch. 
The authors analyzed the complaints in three key ways.  First, they 
looked at the data by company to analyze differences in performance on 
the percentage of company responses disputed by customers, the 
percentage of company responses that the CFPB did not receive in a 
timely manner, and for mortgages specifically, the number of 
complaints relative to products sold.  The authors found that Bank of 
America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were all significantly less timely in 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.  No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 2. See Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/. 
 3. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/. 
 4. Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the 
Consumer Response Field Hearing (Mar. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-of-director-richard-
cordray-at-the-consumer-response-field-hearing/ [hereinafter Cordray, Field Hearing 
Prepared Remarks]. 
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responding to complaints than the average financial institution.  
Additionally, consumers of some of the largest financial services 
providers, including Wells Fargo, Amex, and Bank of America, were 
significantly more likely than the average consumer to dispute the 
company’s response.  Among companies that provide mortgages, 
OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all 
generated more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than 
other banks.  These results should be of interest to both the CFPB and 
the companies named above. 
Second, the authors’ analysis examined differences between 
products and the specific issues about which consumers complained.  
Financial institutions were significantly less timely in responding to 
complaints concerning identity theft, fraud, or embezzlement, compared 
to credit card interest rate complaints (the credit card issue with the most 
complaints), while bank account and credit card complaints were more 
likely to receive a timely response relative to mortgage complaints (the 
product category with the most complaints).  Similarly, bank account, 
credit card, and student loan consumers were less likely to dispute the 
company’s response to their complaints, compared to mortgage 
complaints.  However, those who complained specifically about 
bankruptcy issues related to credit cards, credit card cash advances, 
collection of debt disputes, and credit reporting (either to a credit card 
company or credit reporting agency) were significantly more likely to 
dispute the company’s response, relative to other issues concerning the 
same products. 
Third, the authors of this Article also regressed the complaint data 
on a number of regional demographic factors by ZIP code or ZIP Code 
Tabulation Area (“ZCTA”)5 in order to assess the likelihood of certain 
populations availing themselves of the CFPB’s complaints process in 
the first place.  Once the consumer made a complaint, the authors also 
assessed how likely companies were to respond in a timely fashion and 
how likely those consumers were to dispute the response.  Across a 
variety of specifications (controlling for time, company, product, issue, 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) are generalized areal representations of 
U.S. Postal Service ZIP Code service areas.  ZIP codes, by contrast, are a collection of 
mail delivery routes.  In most instances, ZIP codes and ZCTAs are identical, although 
that is not always the case. See generally ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs), U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/zctas.html (last revised June 20, 
2013). 
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and state fixed effects), the authors found statistically significant 
increases in complaints per mortgage in ZIP codes with larger 
residential proportions of Black, Hispanic, senior citizens (those over 65 
years of age), and high school and college graduates.  In analogous 
regressions for the likelihood that company responses were untimely or 
disputed, a number of these demographic factors were likewise 
significant, including the proportion of senior citizens and the 
percentage of college enrollees.  By virtue of the mandates built into 
Dodd-Frank, these subgroups are of particular interest to the Bureau, as 
discussed below. 
Part I of this Article provides the general background of the CFPB.  
Part II describes the process by which consumers can lodge complaints 
with the CFPB and details the history and structure of the Consumer 
Complaint Database.  Part III explains the empirical methodology and 
summary statistics for the complaints in the Database.  Part IV presents 
the results of the analysis.  Part V considers the implications of these 
findings for the CFPB and the financial services companies that it 
regulates. 
I. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
Title X of Dodd-Frank established the CFPB as the independent 
executive agency responsible for regulating “the offering and provision 
of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer 
financial laws.”6  The mission of the Bureau is to “make markets for 
consumer financial products and services work for Americans—whether 
they are applying for a mortgage, choosing among credit cards, or using 
any number of other consumer financial products.”7  The CFPB operates 
on a budget of $541 million annually, about 10% of which is allocated 
to consumer response operations, e.g., the formal complaints process.8  
In addition to assisting consumers with specific complaints and 
aggregating complaint data, the CFPB also works to educate consumers, 
                                                                                                                                         
 6. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012).  As a note, the agency is not “independent” in 
certain respects, i.e., it is housed for budgetary purposes in the Federal Reserve. See 
infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 7. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ [hereinafter CFPB, About Us]. 
 8. The CFPB Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and Report, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan-and-report/#budget-overview [hereinafter 
CFPB, Strategic Plan]. 
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research consumer behavior, supervise financial companies with over 
$10 billion in assets, and enforce federal consumer financial protection 
laws.9 
The concept of a federal consumer financial protection agency 
dates back to a 2007 essay by then-Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth 
Warren in the summer edition of the Democracy journal.10  Warren’s 
“Unsafe at Any Rate” intentionally echoed Ralph Nader’s 1965 “Unsafe 
at Any Speed,” which detailed the dangers of an unregulated automotive 
industry.11  She decried the “tattered patchwork” of oversight over 
financial products and services.12  In contrast to consumer products, 
which were subject to “basic safety regulations well in advance of 
reaching store shelves,” Warren argued that overlapping state and 
federal regulatory regimes enabled financial services companies to 
“trick” and “trap” unwary consumers.13  Warren called for a Financial 
Product Safety Commission to be modeled after the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission of the 1970s with the mission “to establish 
guidelines for consumer disclosures, collect and report data about the 
uses of different financial products, review new financial products for 
safety, and require modification of dangerous products before they can 
be marketed to the public.”14 
President Barak Obama, after his first presidential election, 
incorporated elements of Warren’s plan into his economic agenda.15  In 
April of 2009, the White House’s chief economic adviser, Lawrence 
Summers, met with his former Harvard colleague, Elizabeth Warren, 
apparently to discuss the design of a new regulatory agency.16  Around 
the same time, President Obama publicly supported the Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, proposed as a stand-alone bill 
in April 2009 by Senators Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and Charles Schumer (D-
                                                                                                                                         
 9. See CFPB, About Us, supra note 7. 
 10. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe At Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8. 
 11. See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
 12. See Warren, supra note 10, at 9. 
 13. See id. at 9–11. 
 14. See id. at 17. 
 15. Administration Said to Eye New Finance Regulatory Panel, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (May 20, 2009), http://nyti.ms/1eFZKdh. 
 16. See Damian Paletta, Fight Over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is 
Signed, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748 
704746804575367502836650966.html. 
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N.Y.) in the Senate17 and Representatives Brad Miller (D-Calif.) and 
Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) in the House.18  President Obama used the same 
analogy in promoting the idea as Warren had in her 2007 article: 
[w]hen you buy a toaster, if it explodes in your face, there’s a law 
that says your toasters need to be safe.  But when you get a credit 
card or a mortgage, there’s no law on the books that says if that 
explodes in your face financially, somehow you’re going to be 
protected.19 
In June of 2009, the Treasury Department under President Obama 
included a proposal for a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency 
(the “CFPA”) in his comprehensive financial regulatory reform plan, “A 
New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation.”20  
In keeping with Warren’s original paper, the report argued that the 
CFPA was needed to “protect consumers and investors from financial 
abuse.”21  In particular, the goal of the agency was to “reduce gaps in 
federal supervision and enforcement; improve coordination with the 
states; set higher standards for financial intermediaries; and promote 
consistent regulation of similar products.”22  Although financial industry 
executives heavily lobbied against the creation of a new regulatory 
body, the idea attracted legislative interest.23  Representative Barney 
Frank, an early supporter, helped shepherd the financial reform bill 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2009, S. 566, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 18. Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2009, H.R. 1705, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  Representative Delahunt and Senator Durbin had previously sponsored the 
similar Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act of 2008 in the House and Senate, 
respectively; neither bill made it out of committee. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013). 
 19. Ryan Grim, Obama Backs Financial Product Safety Commission Concept, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/20/obama-backs-
financial-pro_n_177433.html. 
 20. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, available at www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter A NEW FOUNDATION]. 
 21. See id. at 55. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY ACT (H.R. 3126): THE WRONG APPROACH TO STRONGER 
CONSUMER PROTECTION (July 2009), available at http://www.aba.com/Press/ 
Documents/fc4d91913d034b199f17ecb7b6cc2c21ConsumerAgencyWrongApproachO
nePager071709.pdf; Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid 
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/ 
business/economy/01regulate.html; Paletta, supra note 16. 
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through the House with the agency provision intact, albeit with some 
modifications to garner Republican support and enable passage.24  In the 
Senate, Senator Christopher Dodd’s financial reform plan also included 
provisions for the creation of a new agency.25  In contrast to the Obama 
and House plans, however, Senator Dodd’s version was called the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and pursuant to a legislative 
compromise with Senator Bob Corker, Senator Dodd proposed that it be 
housed within the Federal Reserve.26  The final version of the bill 
retained both of these changes and was signed into law by President 
Obama on July 21, 2010.27  The CFPB officially opened one year later 
on July 21, 2011 with Richard Cordray as acting director.28 
II. THE CFPB’S COMPLAINTS PROCESS 
The responsibility for receiving, settling, and aggregating 
individual consumer complaints seems to have been contemplated as 
part of the CFPB’s ambit from the beginning.  Although Professor 
Warren’s 2007 article does not specifically advocate for a formal 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. House modifications from the original Obama proposal included: oversight by 
one director, rather than a four-member board; exemptions for community banks; and 
the loss of a planned requirement to have companies offer simpler (“plain vanilla”) 
versions of particular products. See, e.g., DAVID H. CARPENTER & MARK JICKLING, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40696, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CFPA) AS PROPOSED BY THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION AND H.R. 3126 (2009), available at assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
R40696_20091109.pdf; Paletta, supra note 16; David Stout & Stephen Labaton, Vote 
Backs a Financial Oversight Body, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, 
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/business/23regs.html?ref=consumerfinancialprotectionb
ureau. 
 25. Arthur Delaney & Shahien Nasiripour, Dodd Unveils Financial Regulatory 
Reform Bill With ‘Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,’ HUFFINGTON POST, June 
17, 2010, www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/15/dodd-unveils-financial-re_n_499569. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.  No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 28. The political battle over leadership of the agency is beyond the scope of this 
paper. See, e.g., Suzanna Andrews, The Woman Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, 
Nov. 2011, www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/11/elizabeth-warren-201111.  A 
letter dated May 2, 2011, signed by 44 Republican senators who refused to confirm any 
CFPB director without “reforms” in the Bureau’s structure, is available online. Letter 
from Republican Senators, to Barrack Obama, President (May 2, 2011), available at 
www.aba.com/aba/documents/blogs/doddfrank/SenateToObamaCFPBApril2011.pdf. 
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complaint process, maintaining a publicly available consumer product 
database that contains individual consumer complaints was an integral 
function of the Consumer Product Safety Commission that she used as 
her model.29  Every one of the pre-Dodd-Frank iterations of legislation 
to create a consumer financial agency had specifically vested it with the 
responsibility of receiving and resolving individual consumer 
complaints related to financial products and services.30  For example, 
one of the main objectives of the Commission created by the Consumer 
Credit Safety Commission Act of 2008 was to “collect, investigate, 
resolve, and inform the public about consumer complaints regarding 
consumer credit,” including by creating a consumer credit customer 
hotline.31  Both the Senate and House versions of the Financial Product 
Safety Commission Act of 2009 used similar language to describe the 
complaints process to be included within the new agency’s purview.32  
Likewise, in explaining his 2009 “New Foundation” plan, President 
Obama claimed that to achieve its goals, the CFPA “should have a wide 
variety of tools” at its disposal, including authority for “collecting and 
tracking complaints about consumer financial services and facilitating 
complaint resolution with respect to federally-supervised institutions.”33  
Dodd-Frank preserves the consumer financial complaint process as one 
of the CFPB’s core functions:34 
The Director shall establish a unit whose functions shall include 
establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, and a 
database or utilizing an existing database to facilitate the centralized 
collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer complaints 
regarding consumer financial products or services.35 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. See Warren, supra note 10; see also Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2051–2089 (2012). 
 30. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act, S. 3629, 110th Cong. 
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3629/text.  The House 
version (H.R. 7258) was identical; see Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act, H.R. 
7258, 110th Cong. (2008); see also supra notes 17 and 18. 
 31. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act, S. 3629, 110th Cong. 
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3629/text;  Consumer 
Credit Safety Commission Act, H.R. 7258, 110th Cong. (2008).  
 32. See supra notes 17 and 18. 
 33. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 20, at 62. 
 34. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 35. Id. 
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In addition to maintaining the complaint collection process, Dodd-
Frank also requires the Bureau to provide an analysis of all of the 
complaints received in the Bureau’s semiannual report to Congress.36  
Furthermore, the CFPB must provide a “timely response” to any 
consumer complaint, and companies subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction 
are likewise required to respond in a “timely” fashion to the Bureau.37 
The CFPB’s complaints process, including the resulting data and 
analysis, is pivotal to the agency’s work in three ways.38  First, it enables 
the Bureau to assist individual consumers with specific complaints 
through one unified regulatory interface.39  Second, it provides the 
Bureau with relevant data for performing the investigative and 
regulatory functions.40  Third, it provides a snapshot into consumers’ 
issues and the financial companies that serve those consumers.41 
The need to streamline consumer complaints and questions about 
consumer financial products was, apparently, neither a new42 nor a 
partisan concern.43  Since 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (“OCC”) began collaborating with state banking departments 
to share complaint data on a state-by-state basis.44  Republican-
appointed Comptroller John C. Dugan noted in a January 2007 speech 
that his office received “numerous inquiries and complaints from 
consumers of institutions that [the Comptroller] do[es]n’t regulate, and 
the same is true for our sister agencies at the federal and state level. . . . 
                                                                                                                                         
 36. See 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c)(4) (2012). 
 37. See 12 U.S.C. § 5534(a) (2012). 
 38. See Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. For example, Comptroller John C. Dugan raised these concerns as early as 
2006, before the financial crisis. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, OCC, CSBS Agree on Consumer Complaint Information-Sharing Plan 
(Nov. 20, 2006), available at www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2006/nr-ia-
2006-126.html [hereinafter OCC, 11/20/2006 Press Release]. 
 43. Although the legislation creating the CFPB was passed by a Democratic 
legislature and signed by a Democratic president, the OCC under Republican President 
Bush initially promoted the efforts to streamline consumer complaints. See John C. 
Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Exchequer Club and Women 
in Housing and Finance 20 (Jan. 17, 2007), available at www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2007/pub-speech-2007-4.pdf [hereinafter Dugan, 01/17/2007 
Remarks]. 
 44. OCC, 11/20/2006 Press Release, supra note 42. 
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Unfortunately, that process takes time; is sometimes constrained by 
customer privacy restrictions; and has afforded few systematic 
opportunities to follow up on the disposition of complaints that have 
been referred.”45  As a potential result of the OCC’s focus on reducing 
consumer confusion, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council agreed in September 2007 to establish an inter-agency working 
group “to identify best practices related to the banking agencies’ 
consumer complaint process.”46  These steps were far removed from full 
agency integration, though.  For example, one of Dugan’s suggestions to 
the working group was a common interagency Web portal that would 
route customers to the appropriate regulatory body.47 
A similar desire for a common consumer interface motivated 
Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.) to introduce the Financial 
Consumer Hotline Act of 2007.  Representative Maloney’s bill was 
designed to “establish a single, toll-free telephone number consumers 
can call if they have a question or complaint and want to speak to the 
bank’s regulator.”48  Although the bill passed in the House by a large 
margin, it died in the Senate.49 
Consumers’ confusion prior to the creation of the CFPB was not 
surprising: there were at least 12 federal agencies with some, 
occasionally overlapping, responsibility for consumer financial 
protection, in addition to state attorneys general and banking 
regulators.50  For example, a consumer with a complaint about a national 
                                                                                                                                         
 45. Dugan, 01/17/2007 Remarks, supra note 43, at 20. 
 46. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2007 4 (2007), 
available at www.ffiec.gov/PDF/annrpt07.pdf. 
 47. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller 
Dugan Tells Conference that Consumers Will Benefit From More Unified Interagency 
Approach to Complaint Handling (Oct. 15, 2007), available at www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2007/nr-occ-2007-111.html. 
 48. Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, Speech in the House of 
Representatives (Mar. 12, 2009), available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 
D?r111:1./temp/_r111qX5HaL. 
 49. The bill passed 408-1 in the House. See H.R. 4332, 110th Cong. (2007), 
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr4332.  However, in the 
Senate, the Financial Consumer Hotline Act never moved past the committee stage. See 
S. 3153, 110th Cong. (2008), available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3153. 
 50. These 12 agencies were: OCC, Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit 
Union Administration, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Veterans Administration (for VA-guaranteed mortgage loans), Internal Revenue 
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bank would have needed to contact the OCC while a complaint about a 
state-chartered member bank would have needed to go to the bank’s 
primary federal supervisor (either the Federal Reserve or the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) or state regulators.51  If the complaint 
dealt with a mortgage, however, it would have had to be routed to the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, or the Veterans Administration, depending on the 
type of loan.52  As a result, the OCC alone reported that it both received 
11,000 misdirected complaints from other agencies and referred an 
additional 10,000 misdirected complaints to other agencies—out of the 
70,000 annual complaints opened in 2007.53 
In addition to providing consumers with one interagency regulatory 
interface, the data garnered through the complaints process provides 
input into the CFPB’s enforcement arm, both on an individual level and 
in the aggregate.  According to the CFPB Supervision and Examination 
Manual, which provides guidance to examiners in overseeing consumer 
finance companies, the complaint data helps to determine which 
companies should be subjected to an examination.54 
In undertaking a Risk Assessment, examiners should consider both 
the volume and the nature of consumer complaints received by the 
entity or by regulatory bodies including the CFPB. In addition to 
shedding important light on the extent and types of concerns of 
consumers utilizing the entity’s consumer financial products or 
services, complaints may provide indications of potential regulatory 
violations, including unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices 
                                                                                                                                         
Service, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Defense (for payday lending to 
military members), and Department of Justice. See Levitin, supra note 18, at 327–28. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. H.R. 4332, The Financial Consumer Hotline Act of 2007: Providing 
Consumers with Easy Access to the Appropriate Banking Regulator Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th 
Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of John G. Walsh, Chief of Staff and Public Affairs, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg40436/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg40436.pdf. 
 54. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION 
MANUAL 21 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_ 
cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf. 
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(UDAAPs).  How the entity handles complaints is also a key element 
in evaluating its compliance management system.55 
If the CFPB’s Consumer Response unit deems that a company has 
not sufficiently addressed an individual complaint, the unit can refer the 
issue to the Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending and 
Equal Opportunity “for further action.”56  Moreover, the Bureau claims 
that the complaints that it receives also enable it to “write better rules 
and regulations,” presumably by providing detailed information about 
the practices perceived as consumer-unfriendly so that the Bureau could 
target such practices with new guidelines.57 
In keeping with the extensive debate over the CFPB’s creation, the 
consumer complaints process has not escaped controversy, particularly 
its third function: providing information to the public about financial 
services practices.  In 2012, financial services companies strenuously 
objected to the CFPB’s proposed policy of including the name of the 
company in the complaint in the publicly available database.58  
According to the Bureau, disclosing the number and type of complaints 
against individual companies was essential to providing transparency in 
the marketplace, including the enabling of third-party sources to rate 
companies on product performance and the services offered.59  By 
contrast, the financial services industry worried that “the inclusion of 
issuer identification will have serious adverse implications for 
consumers and card issuers alike. . . . Most importantly, absent the 
ability to verify and properly respond to consumer accusations, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 55. Id. 
 56. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 36 (2013), available at files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/201303_CFPB_SemiAnnualReport_March2013.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, SEMI-
ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. As a note, confidential identifying information about consumers is not included 
in the Database. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Launches Consumer Complaint Database (June 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
launches-consumer-complaint-database/.  For a discussion of some of the controversy 
surrounding the disclosure policy, see BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., DOCKET NO. 
CFPB-2012-0023, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA 4–5 (2013), available 
at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_Final-Policy-Statement-Disclosure-
of-Consumer-Complaint-Data.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER 
COMPLAINT DATA]. 
 59. Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4. 
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inclusion of an issuer’s identity may cause unnecessary harm to the 
reputation and the safety and soundness of that issuer.”60  After 
receiving comments and weighing input from industry groups, consumer 
advocacy organizations, and individual consumers, the CFPB officially 
adopted its policy of disclosing company identity in March of 2013.61  
On June 19, 2012, the Consumer Complaint Database officially opened 
to the public.62 
The Bureau began accepting consumer complaints on its first day 
of operations in July 2011, albeit at first only those related to credit 
cards.63  The Consumer Response division has since expanded to 
complaints about: mortgages (on December 1, 2011); bank accounts and 
services, private student loans, vehicle loans, and other consumer loans 
(on March 1, 2012);64 credit reporting complaints (on October 22, 
2012);65 and money transfers (on April 4, 2013).66  Since the Bureau 
opened, it has received over 100,000 consumer complaints, 91,000 in 
2012 alone.67  Consumers can submit complaints via the CFPB’s 
website, telephone, mail, email, fax, or by referral to the agency from a 
third party.68 
The Bureau, upon receiving the complaint, must confirm that there 
is a commercial relationship between the consumer and company, that 
the complaint is not a duplicate, and that the complaint was submitted 
by the identified consumer or his or her authorized representative.69  
                                                                                                                                         
 60. Letter from Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Jan. 
30, 2012), available at http://www.cbanet.org/documents/CBA_Credit_Card_ 
Complaint_Data_Comment_Letter_01302012.pdf. 
 61. CFPB, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA, supra note 58. 
 62. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A SNAPSHOT OF 
COMPLAINTS RECEIVED 2 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/201210_cfpb_consumer_response_september-30-snapshot.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, 
CONSUMER RESPONSE]. 
 63. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 15. 
 64. See CFPB, CONSUMER RESPONSE, supra note 62. 
 65. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 15. 
 66. Scott Pluta, Now Accepting Money Transfer Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 4, 2013), www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/now-accepting-
money-transfer-complaints/. 
 67. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 19. 
 68. The plurality of complaints (46%) are submitted through the website; 34% are 
referrals. Id. at 20. 
 69. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558, 
37,561 (June 22, 2012). 
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However, the CFPB does not independently verify whether the 
complaint has merit, which has been another point of contention with 
financial services companies.70  Screened complaints are then forwarded 
to the appropriate company (or the appropriate regulatory agency),71 and 
the company must respond to the complaint within 15 days to be 
considered “timely.”72  If a company requires more time to respond to 
the complaint, it could indicate to the CFPB that resolution is “in 
progress” but must provide a final response within 60 days.73  Company 
responses fall into one of six categories: company reported closed with 
explanation; company reported closed with monetary relief; company 
reported closed with non-monetary relief; company reviewing company 
provided administrative response; and company reported closed 
(without relief or explanation).74  Once the CFPB receives the 
company’s response, consumers have 30 days to provide feedback, 
including an opportunity to dispute the company’s response.75 
Each of these steps, including the company’s timeliness, its 
response, and whether the consumer disputed the complaint, is recorded 
in the public Consumer Complaint Database, along with the consumer’s 
ZIP code, the date of submission, and the type of complaint (i.e., the 
product or service and the specific kind of issue to which the complaint 
relates).76  The Database only includes complaints about companies 
subject to CFPB jurisdiction, including: “banks, thrifts, and credit 
unions with over $10 billion in assets, and their affiliates, as well as 
certain nonbank consumer financial service providers, such as mortgage 
lenders, brokers and servicers; private education lenders; payday 
lenders; and larger participants of the consumer reporting and debt 
                                                                                                                                         
 70. CFPB, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA, supra note 58. 
 71. According to the Bureau, 11% of complaints in 2012 were referred to other 
regulatory agencies. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 32 n.15. 
 72. Id. at 17 n.11. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Prior to June 1, 2012, companies could also respond with “full resolution 
provided,” “partial resolution provided,” and “closed with relief,” but those categories 
were subsumed into “closed with monetary relief.”  Similarly, “no resolution provided” 
and “closed without relief” were incorporated into “closed with explanation.”  
According to the CFPB, the majority of 2012 complaints were reported closed with 
explanation (65%); only 2% were reported closed without relief or explanation. Id. at 
32–34. 
 75. Id. at 35. 
 76. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/technical-documentation/ (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
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collection markets.”77  The CFPB has defined “larger” in the context of 
consumer reporting companies as earning more than $7 million in 
annual receipts;78 and debt collection agencies earning more than $10 
million in annual receipts from consumer debt collection activities.79 
III. THE DATA USED 
The assembled statistics comparing companies is based on the 
110,479 complaints and affiliated identifying information contained in 
the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database.80  The analysis focuses on 
comparing company-specific outcomes: the likelihood of each company 
to receive a complaint relative to the number of products that the 
company sells;81 the likelihood that each company’s consumers would 
dispute the company’s response; and each company’s timeliness in 
responding.  The authors performed a series of regressions to assess 
whether certain demographic information correlated with the total 
number of complaints, the number of complaints that the consumers 
dispute, and the timely response rate of companies per ZCTA or ZIP 
code.  Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the analysis, and the 
Appendix provides the sources and descriptions of each of the variables 
included. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the various products and 
issues in the CFPB Database.  The largest product categories—credit 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. CFPB, Strategic Plan, supra note 8. 
 78. CFPB Now Taking Complaints on Credit Reporting, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-now-taking-complaints-on-credit-reporting/. 
 79. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Puts Companies On Notice About 
Harmful Debt Collection Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 10, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_factsheet_debt-collection.pdf, at 
1. 
 80. We lose a small number of observations (321) when trying to match ZIP codes 
to our available ZIP code to ZCTA database, and another small number (72) when 
merging with the census data.  Companies with less than 10 observations were also 
dropped.  The CFPB reports data at the ZIP code level, but most census and similar 
demographic data are at the ZCTA level. 
 81. The only product with readily available and trustworthy market share data is 
home mortgages, via the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.  Regulation C, now under the 
auspices of the CFPB, requires lending institutions to publicly disclose loan data, 
including the race of applicants and borrowers, all by ZIP code. See Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act, FFIEC, www.ffiec.gov/hmda/default.htm (last visited June 24, 2013). 
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card and mortgage complaints—comprise more than half of the 
Database’s complaints.82  Generally, a small number of complaint issues 
are coded for each product except for credit card complaints, which falls 
into one of 33 different categories.83  The analysis includes information 
about the ZIP code level prevalence of various demographic factors to 
the CFPB Complaint Database.84  In addition to some general 
demographic variables of interest, including race and median income, 
this study also concentrated on the groups to which the CFPB is required 
to provide targeted assistance: military service members,85 Americans 
over 62 years of age,86 and students.87  The expectation was that the 
number of complaints from ZIP codes with high concentrations of 
service members, senior citizens and college or graduate students, 
holding all else equal, would be higher than average.  Even if these 
groups do not experience disproportionately higher incidences of unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts or practices by financial services providers, 
it was expected that the CFPB’s outreach to these groups would raise 
awareness about the ability to complain to the Bureau and/or increase 
the salience of the complaints process.  However, since banks should 
largely be aware of the CFPB’s differential focus on these specific 
groups, it was also anticipated that the number of disputed or untimely 
complaints would be lower for these populations (and by proxy, ZIP 
codes with higher concentrations of them), at least if banks had 
responded rationally to the threat of increased regulatory intervention by 
the Bureau. 
Some regression specifications also include a variable for the 
availability of high-speed Internet access between 1999 and 2006.  If 
locations with longstanding access to Internet source providers 
registered disproportionately more complaints, it could be suspected that 
the CFPB was merely cherry-picking the Internet-savvy, as the plurality 
of complaints the Bureau receives are web-based.88 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. For summary statistics, see Tables 1 and 2. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Appendix. 
 85. Via an Office of Service Member Affairs. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(e)(1) (2012).  
Dodd-Frank specifically authorizes the Director of the CFPB to locate such an office 
“near military bases, military treatment facilities, or other similar military facilities.” Id. 
 86. Via an Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans. See 12 U.S.C. § 
5493(g)(1). 
 87. Via the Private Education Loan Ombudsman. See 12 U.S.C. § 5535(a) (2012). 
 88. See supra note 68. 
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One of the chief complaints that financial service providers lodged 
when the CFPB announced plans to publicize its complaint Database 
was the lack of scale to normalize the data.89  For example, a bank with 
100,000 open accounts and 500 complaints might look worse than a 
bank with 1,000 accounts outstanding and 200 complaints, at least if 
consumers were not informed of each bank’s respective size.  
Unfortunately, the CFPB does not yet offer a way to normalize the 
number of complaints in the Database, and the only independently 
verifiable market share data that was accessible for this data was for 
mortgage complaints.  The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) 
requires certain financial institutions to report home lending activity, 
which provides a baseline for the number of mortgages that each bank 
creates.90  However, because of the lagging releases of HMDA data, the 
data is based on the flow of home mortgages that particular companies 
issued as a proxy for the stock of those companies’ 2013 market share of 
outstanding mortgages. 
The proxy regarding outstanding home mortgages could fail for 
several reasons, including the delay between HMDA data collection and 
release, and the mismatch between mortgage originators and servicers.  
The time lag itself is not of major concern because many of the 
mortgage issue complaints in 2012-2013 likely dated to approvals in 
years past.91  A potentially more significant concern is that mortgage 
originators and servicers are not always identical.  For example, if Bank 
of America consistently sells all of its mortgages to Citibank, our 
calculation would overstate Bank of America’s number of complaints 
per mortgage because it would not account for the complaints filed once 
Citibank owned the mortgages.  Without further disclosures from 
financial service providers, the HMDA data should at least begin to 
                                                                                                                                         
 89. See, e.g., Letter from Nessa Feddis, Vice President and Senior Counsel, Ctr. for 
Regulatory Compliance, to Monica Jackson 3 (July 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2012/07/clConsumercomplaintdata2012July.pdf 
[hereinafter Feddis Letter]. 
 90. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, FFEIC (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm. 
 91. As well, none of the companies listed in Table 4 below were subject to a major 
merger between 2011 and 2013. See, e.g., Alan Kline, Bank Population Shrinks Rapidly 
Amid Lull in Startups, AM. BANKER (Sept. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_172/bank-population-shrinks-rapidly-
amid-lull-in-startups-1061817-1.html. 
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provide a baseline to assess the likelihood that a recent mortgage will 
give rise to a consumer complaint. 
There are a few more limitations to the data and its results.  For 
example, financial service providers have complained that the data is not 
representative because they merely measured the number of 
complainants, not the number of actual unfair or deceptive practices.92  
For example, if Bank of America customers were identifiably different 
in some way from Citibank customers such that the former were more 
likely to complain than the latter, there might be a significant difference 
in the number of complaints but not in the incidence of unfair practices.  
Additionally, the Database does not differentiate between “major” and 
“minor” complaints.93  As a result, even if two banks were to have the 
same number of complaints relative to number of mortgages 
outstanding, for instance, one bank might still be engaging in worse 
practices, but that distinction would not be apparent from the CFPB 
data.  Furthermore, because the CFPB’s regulatory authority over banks 
is limited to those with over $10 billion in assets, complaints about 
smaller banks are excluded from the Database, which might distort 
consumer perception of the relative performance of smaller and bigger 
companies.  Finally, companies were also concerned that consumer 
complaints entered into the Database might not be meritorious because 
the CFPB does not verify the accuracy of each complaint, thereby 
skewing the perception of each company’s performance.94 
These issues, while presumably of concern to the CFPB, are not 
particularly problematic for our analysis.  First, as discussed above, the 
Bureau does verify that the consumer has a business relationship with 
the company in question, so only actual disgruntled customers can 
submit complaints.95  More importantly, the analysis herein on company 
variation does not implicate most of the aforementioned concerns.  For 
example, it is unlikely that the customers of any one company would be 
more or less inclined to concoct frivolous claims, especially given the 
size and national scale of the companies under review, which allow for 
randomized, representative data.  This is aside from the unlikelihood 
that most complainants would even dispute a company’s response to a 
truly frivolous complaint, given the additional time that such disputes 
                                                                                                                                         
 92. See Feddis Letter, supra note 89. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558, 
37,561 (June 22, 2012). 
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require.  Moreover, even if all of the complaints against a particular 
company were frivolous or “minor,” it does not excuse that company 
from providing timely responses.  If anything, the more frivolous or 
minor the complaint, the easier it should be for the company to respond 
quickly. 
IV. THE RESULTS 
A. THE COMPANY-SPECIFIC RESULTS 
Table 3 lists the 27 companies with a significantly higher 
proportion of untimely responses than average, at the 10% significance 
level.  Among these, the least timely company was the Prudent Law 
Group, a loan modification specialist, which responded late to 92% of 
its 12 complaints.  Among the larger institutions, Bank of America, 
Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely than average, 
with untimely response rates of 6%, 4%, and 5%, respectively. 
Table 4 analogously reports the list of companies with a statistically 
higher than average proportion of disputed company responses, ranked 
by the proportion disputed.96  While the sample size for most companies 
is relatively small, Table 4 shows that consumers disputed significantly 
more responses from 17 companies, including some of the largest banks 
in the U.S., including Wells Fargo (24% disputed) and Bank of America 
(22% disputed).97  Interestingly, the companies with the largest 
percentage of disputed responses were BMW Financial Services (53% 
disputed) and Charles Schwab Bank (40% disputed).98  However, these 
rates might represent higher consumer expectations associated with the 
companies’ positions at the upper end of the consumer finance market. 
In Table 5, the HMDA data described above was used to assess the 
number of mortgage complaints per mortgage that originated for the 
banks with the largest number of CFPB records.  Given the 
methodology, it would be inaccurate to say that, for example, 25% of 
                                                                                                                                         
 96. All consumer complainants have the opportunity to dispute the company’s 
response within 30 days of receiving it. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
56, at 35.  From Table 1, the mean number of disputed responses across all categories 
of products and services was 21%, which is identical to the CFPB’s reported percentage 
in October 2012. See CFPB, CONSUMER RESPONSE, supra note 62, at 4. 
 97. See Table 4. 
 98. Albeit these are the two smallest sample sizes, consisting of 19 and 20 
observations, respectively, in the data set. 
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OneWest Bank’s outstanding mortgages generated complaints, as some 
of the 1,113 mortgage complaints could have been lodged for products 
sold in multiple years past and not in 2011 alone.  However, the number 
of mortgages that originated in 2011 provides some basis for 
normalizing the number of complaints received, thus serving as a 
benchmark for comparing the banks.  By this metric, OneWest performs 
far worse than any other bank.99  Among the banks with over one 
million mortgages that originated in 2011, Bank of America received the 
highest percentage of complaints.100 
B. RESULTS BASED ON ZIP CODE DEMOGRAPHICS, PRODUCTS, AND 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 
The remainder of the analysis is not company-specific, and instead 
focuses on the demographic information from ZIP codes with reported 
complaints and the products and specific issues about which consumers 
complained.  Table 6 displays the results for a regression of the log of 
the total number of mortgage complaints over the number of households 
with a mortgage for ZCTAs with at least one registered complaint in the 
Database.  Our model for Table 6 is 
 
CPMit  =  β0 + β1demographicsit + β2quarterit + β3stateit + 
β4companyit + εit, 
 
where CPMit is the log of mortgage complaints per 2011 mortgage 
originations at the ZIP code level, and demographicsit is a vector of 
demographic characteristics.101  Quarter-fixed effects control for 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. However, our ranking measure of complaints per mortgages originated in 2011 
will overstate the tendency for the stock of a company’s outstanding mortgages to 
generate complaints if that company’s market share of 2011 originations was lower 
than its origination market share in the past.  We note that OneWest was predominantly 
formed with the then bankrupt IndyMac’s assets in 2009, and that Bank of America 
purchased Countrywide (a massive mortgage lender) in 2008. 
 100. See Table 5. 
 101. Fixed effects are {0,1} variables that are included to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (an unobserved quantity that could influence the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables).  For example, if a certain demographic 
characteristics were (1) not included as controls in the regression, (2) constant over time 
at the state level, and (3) influenced the relationship between mortgage complaints and 
an included variable, the coefficient on the included variable would be biased in the 
regression.  State fixed effects control for this possibility. See Benjamin A. Lindy, The 
Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on Student Achievement: Evidence from 
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heterogeneity in complaints across time while state-fixed effects control 
for heterogeneity at the state level.  In the full specification, company-
fixed effects are included to control for idiosyncratic company effects. 
Note that our reduced-form model cannot prove causality: for 
example, if ZIP codes with higher proportions of senior citizens have 
more complaints per mortgage, we cannot determine if mortgage 
companies are treating older borrowers worse than younger ones, or if 
senior citizens are just more likely to complain to the CFPB.  However, 
even in the absence of causal evidence, the results at least suggest that 
mortgage lenders might need to show increased care toward certain 
populations. 
Table 6 shows that even after controlling for quarter-, state-, and 
company-fixed effects, the complaint rates are statistically higher in ZIP 
codes with higher concentrations of African-Americans, Hispanics, and 
seniors.102  For the most controlled specifications, the complaint rate 
falls statistically as the median income of a ZIP code rises but increases 
with the median income of African-American or Hispanic residents.  
However, areas with higher concentrations of active duty military are 
significantly more likely to complain only in the specifications that do 
not control for the number of Internet service providers (“ISPs”), rural 
concentration, and foreclosure risk score. 
Areas with better-educated populations (i.e., high school and 
college graduates) are significantly more likely to report mortgage 
complaints.  ZCTAs with high employment rates appear to also have 
larger numbers of complaints, but the level of significance drops once 
the state- and company-fixed effects are added. 
A somewhat surprising result is in the final column specification, 
which shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimated 
for a ZIP code’s number of ISPs.  These authors predicted that 
borrowers with faster Internet access would be able to file complaints 
online at a higher rate than borrowers without such access.  Finally, ZIP 
codes with a higher foreclosure risk score had statistically lower 
complaints per mortgage.  This foreclosure finding is potentially 
troubling for the CFPB and a potential cause of action for consumer 
advocates because it suggests that areas with homes at the greatest risk 
                                                                                                                                         
A New Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE L.J. 1130, 1147 (2011) (explaining fixed 
effects). 
 102. The census data track senior citizens over the age of 65 rather than 62. 
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of foreclosure are not sufficiently availing themselves of the CFPB’s 
complaint system. 
Next, Table 7 provides results pertaining to whether a complaint 
was resolved in a timely manner across company and product.  Here, the 
individual level data is coded as a 0 for an undisputed complaint and a 1 
for a disputed complaint, and a logit regression ran the individual data.  
The specification of fixed effects is the same as in Table 6 but includes 
issue-fixed effects, enabled by the use of individual data.  The only 
independent variable that produced significant results is college 
enrollment: ZCTAs with higher levels of college students were 
significantly more likely to report untimely responses from companies.  
Because students are a particular focus of the CFPB, this result is both 
unexpected and troubling.  Higher proportions of Blacks and Hispanics 
were positively correlated with untimeliness of the company’s response, 
albeit not significantly. 
Table 7 also disaggregates timeliness by product and by specific 
complaint within each product type.  The timeliness of corporate 
responses for each product listed in the table is compared to mortgages, 
the omitted category.  Thus, companies responding to bank account or 
service and credit card complaints were significantly more likely to be 
timely in their response than mortgage companies.  Companies were 
also more likely to be timely in responding to student loan complaints 
although the level of significance declines once company-fixed effects 
are included. 
Similarly, the regressions for issues within each product type 
compare the timeliness of response to the largest issue (determined by 
the number of complaints registered with the CFPB) in each category.103  
According to the analysis, credit card companies seem to discriminate 
the most based on issue type.104  Complaints about the Annual 
Percentage Rate (“APR”) or interest rate and the payoff process were 
significantly more likely to receive a timely response while complaints 
about credit card or debt protection, identity theft/fraud/embezzlement, 
and sale of account were significantly less likely to receive a timely 
response, relative to credit card billing disputes.105  Although it seems 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. See infra Table 7. 
 104. See id. (showing the coefficients for product category); see also infra Table 9 
(showing the coefficients for a subset of the issues within those product categories).  
Due to space restrictions, the issue coefficients found in Table 9 are from the 
specification in the final column of Table 7. 
 105. See infra Table 9. 
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counterintuitive that companies would not respond in a timely fashion to 
fraud claims in particular, as they can pose a more endemic and 
expensive problem for companies if not quickly resolved, it is possible 
that only certain types of complaints would be routed through the CFPB 
rather than the credit card seller directly.  Regardless, the divergence in 
timeliness among these products suggests that at least credit card 
companies are selective in prioritizing their timely responses to 
customer complaints. 
Table 8 contains an analogous logit regression of whether a 
complaint was disputed on the same demographic factors described 
above.  These results must be taken with an extra degree of caution, as 
consumers may complain regardless of whether the company responded 
in a satisfactory manner.  We found that areas with more senior citizens 
were more likely to dispute company responses. One hypothesis is that 
many individuals in that age bracket are retirees, and therefore, have 
more time to pursue complaints.  It also might suggest that the CFPB’s 
Office of Older Americans may need to make a more concerted effort to 
work with companies before the dispute stage.  Among the CFPB’s 
other target groups, higher levels of military employment in a ZIP code 
positively correlate with the number of disputes in that area, but not 
significantly so.   At the same time, college enrollment is negatively 
correlated with the number of disputes but not significantly.  Similarly, 
higher numbers of college graduates are more likely to dispute 
complaints, albeit with weaker significance once accounting for 
additional variables and multiple fixed effects.  More rural areas are also 
significantly more likely to dispute responses, although the coefficients 
are not large. As in Table 6, the Foreclosure Risk Score is negatively 
correlated with the number of disputes, although only at a modest level 
of significance. 
Table 8 displays the number of responses disputed among each 
product category.  Again, relative to mortgages, consumers were 
significantly less likely to dispute company responses to complaints 
about bank account or service, credit card, and student loan products.  
Among product issues, consumers were significantly less likely to 
dispute company responses to complaints about bank account funds 
being too low, credit card advertising and marketing, credit card billing 
statements and related fees, and credit monitoring or identity protection 
from credit reporting agencies.  However, consumers were significantly 
more likely to dispute credit card company responses about bankruptcy, 
cash advances, collection debt disputes, credit card or debt protection, a 
2014] SKELETONS IN THE DATABASE 367 
change in credit line or credit reporting, and credit reporting agency 
responses about company investigations and improper use of the credit 
report.  Although these results do not suggest one clear, consistent 
pattern, one possible explanation is that consumers are less satisfied 
with company responses when dealing with more bureaucratic or 
complex processes (i.e., bankruptcy or credit reporting) than with issues 
that are more individualized, simplistic, and easily resolved (i.e., fee 
assessments). 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Without commenting specifically on the consumer finance 
industry’s objections to the level of public disclosure, the CFPB’s 
Consumer Complaint Database is unquestionably a rich source of 
data.106  The total number of complaints and whether the proposed 
company response was timely and disputed provide a snapshot of how 
both the CFPB and the companies that it regulates are performing.  The 
analysis herein incorporates a number of dimensions to determine who 
is complaining and how companies are responding.107  The results 
suggest that the CFPB might need to conduct more outreach in areas 
where homeowners have the highest risk of foreclosure given the lower 
number of complaints in ZIP codes with higher foreclosure risk scores, 
contrary to expectations about who would avail themselves of the 
complaint process (i.e., those facing foreclosure).108  Furthermore, the 
CFPB might need to assert more pressure on companies serving older 
Americans, as areas with more seniors were significantly more likely to 
dispute company resolutions.109 
Likewise, the CFPB’s Private Education Loan Ombudsman should 
be concerned that company responses were significantly more likely to 
be untimely in areas with higher concentrations of students.110  The 
analysis also suggests that some of the biggest companies in the 
consumer finance industry have yet to focus on the potential 
consequences—both regulatory and public relations—for inadequately 
responding to complaints lodged with the CFPB.111  Bank of America, 
Citibank, PNC, and OneWest Bank were significantly more like likely 
                                                                                                                                         
 106. See Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4. 
 107. See supra Part IV; see also infra Tables 3–10 (analyzing statistical results). 
 108. See supra Part IV; infra Table 6. 
 109. See infra Table 8. 
 110. See infra Table 7. 
 111. See infra Table 3. 
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than the average bank to respond in an untimely manner.112  Moreover, 
consumers of several major national financial institutions, including 
Wells Fargo and Bank of America, were significantly more likely to 
dispute the company’s response to their complaints.113  It should also be 
worrisome to executives at, and potential customers of, OneWest Bank, 
HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America, that the volume of 
mortgage complaints that those companies received out of the number of 
mortgages that they sold were disproportionately larger compared to that 
of other large companies.114  The divergent rates of timeliness in 
responding to complaints based on the product and issue also suggest 
that the CFPB needs to stress the importance of timely responses to all 
complaints, not just those that a company deems to be higher 
priorities.115  In addition, to the extent that responses from mortgage 
companies and any financial institution regarding more complex 
products or issues result in more consumer disputes, the CFPB may wish 
to work with companies and consumers at the initial complaint stage to 
preempt any problems that result from disputed responses. 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis demonstrates that the CFPB’s decision to disclose the 
details about the complaints that it receives indeed serves the Bureau’s 
goal of enabling researchers to “analyze, augment, and build” on the 
Consumer Complaint Database.116  The results of the study reveal 
significant differences among financial services providers on how timely 
they are in responding to complaints, and the extent to which consumers 
dispute those responses.  Moreover, the underlying products being 
complained about and the issues consumers had with those products 
drove differences in company response time and percentage of disputes.  
Likewise, the demographics of a complainant’s ZIP code also drove 
significant difference in these key company variables.  Given the 
CFPB’s power to regulate financial services providers, and its stated 
reliance on the Consumer Complaint Database as a key source of 
information about the marketplace, companies should heed these results 
                                                                                                                                         
 112. See id. 
 113. See infra Table 4. 
 114. See infra Table 5. 
 115. See infra Tables 2 and 9. 
 116. See Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4. 
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and strive to improve their response processes for all consumers.  
Additionally, the CFPB should work to ensure that all consumers know 
about and have access to the complaint system, at the very least as a 
means of strengthening the feedback loop. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 Disputed: The complaints disputed by consumers within the 
CFPB’s 30-day window once the company’s response is 
received, as reported in the Consumer Complaint Database 
 Not Timely: The complaints to which the company did not 
respond within the CFPB’s 15-day window once the consumer 
complaint was transmitted, as reported in the Consumer 
Complaint Database 
 Proportion Black: By ZCTA, the respondents who reported 
“Black” or “African-American” as their only race, as reported in 
the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 Proportion Hispanic: By ZCTA, the respondents who reported 
Hispanic or Latino origin (regardless of race), as reported in the 
2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 Median Income (Black): By ZCTA, the household median 
income in the past 12 months (in 2011 inflation-adjusted dollars) 
as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-
Year Estimates, for respondents reporting one race: Black or 
African American 
 Median Income (Hispanic): By ZCTA, the household median 
income in the past 12 months (in 2011 inflation-adjusted dollars) 
as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-
Year Estimates, for respondents reporting Hispanic or Latino 
origin 
 Median Income (All): By ZCTA, the household median income 
in the past 12 months (in 2011 inflation-adjusted dollars) as 
reported in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates by all respondents 
 Seniors: By ZCTA, the percent of the total population aged 65 
and older, as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 Military Employment: By ZCTA, employment status reported 
as in labor force: Armed Forces, as reported in the 2007-2011 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 College Enrollment: By ZCTA, the percent of the total 
population enrolled in college or graduate school, as reported in 
the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 High School Graduates: By ZCTA, the percentage of those 
who reporting being both 25 years or older and a high school 
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graduate (or high school equivalent) out of the ZCTA’s total 
population, as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 College Graduates: By ZCTA, the percentage of those who 
reported being 25 years or older and having a bachelor’s degree 
out of the ZCTA’s total population, as reported in the 2007-2011 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 Unemployment Rate: By ZCTA, the estimated unemployment 
rate for those 16 years of age or older, as reported in the 2007-
2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 Number ISPs: The number of high-speed ISPs per ZIP code in 
2006, as reported by the FCC 
 Rural (RUCA Score): The score of the rural or urban 
concentration within a ZIP code, whereby a score of 1 represents 
a “metropolitan area core: primary flow within an urbanized 
area,” and a score of 10 represents “a rural area: primary flow to 
a tract outside an urbanized area or urban cluster.”117 
 Foreclosure Risk Score: The foreclosure “risk score” at the ZIP 
code level, based on measures of subprime lending, foreclosures, 
delinquency, and vacancies, as calculated by the Local 
Initiatives Support Corporation (“LISC”), whereby the ZIP 
codes are scored in relative terms, such that the highest-risk area 
within each state receives a score of 100, and each other ZIP 
code is assigned a score based on its relative risk profile (i.e., a 
ZIP code with half of the risk of the highest-risk area would 
receive a score of 50).118 
   
                                                                                                                                         
 117. The Census Bureau created the Rural Urban Community Areas (RUCA) 
scores, which are available at the Rural Health Research Center’s website. See RUCA 
Data, RURAL HEALTH RES. CENTER, depts.washington.edu/uwruca/ruca-data.php (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 118. For more information and raw scores, see LISC Foreclosure Risk Scores Data, 
March 2013, FORECLOSURE-RESPONSE.ORG (July 2013), www.foreclosure-
response.org/maps_and_data/lisc_data.html. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Level Obs Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
Not Timely Individual 110,479 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Disputed Individual 110,479 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Complaints per 
Mortgage* 
ZCTA 7,865 0.00 0.01 0 0.44 
Proportion Black ZCTA 15,493 0.10 0.17 0 1.00 
Proportion 
Hispanic 
ZCTA 15,493 0.10 0.17 0 1.00 
Median Income 
(Black) 
ZCTA 10,779 4.81 3.16 0.30 24.78 
Median Income 
(Hispanic) 
ZCTA 12,391 5.24 3.06 0.35 24.69 
Median Income 
(All) 
ZCTA 15,433 5.76 2.42 0.86 24.22 
Proportion 
Seniors 
ZCTA 15,493 0.18 0.07 0 1.00 
Proportion 
Military 
Employment 
ZCTA 15,480 0.01 0.05 0 0.99 
Proportion 
College 
ZCTA 15,493 0.08 0.07 0 1.03 
High School ZCTA 15,493 0.19 0.08 0 1.00 
College Graduate ZCTA 15,493 0.20 0.13 0 1.00 
Unemployment 
Rate 
ZCTA 15,480 0.09 0.05 0 0.77 
ISP ZIP 15,094 8.77 3.30 0 21 
RUCA ZIP 16,759 2.78 2.90 1 10.60 
Foreclosure Risk 
Score 
ZIP 14,886 0.09 0.14 0 1.00 
 For ZCTAs with at least one mortgage complaint and not more 
mortgage complaints than households with mortgages listed by 
the census. 
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TABLE 2: PRODUCT TYPES AND ISSUES 
Bank Account or Service 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
Account opening, closing, or management 7,026 40.58 
Deposits and withdrawals 4,904 28.32 
Making/receiving payments, sending 
money 1,482 8.56 
Problems caused by my funds being low 2,859 16.51 
Using a debit or ATM card 1,043 6.02 
Total119 17,314 100 
 
Consumer Loan 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
Account terms and changes 174 5.88 
Managing the line of credit 227 7.67 
Managing the loan or lease 1,445 48.82 
Problems when you are unable to pay 624 21.08 
Shopping for a line of credit 61 2.06 
Shopping for a loan or lease 124 4.19 
Taking out the loan or lease 305 10.30 
Total 2,960 100 
 
Credit Reporting 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
Credit monitoring or identity protection 209 3.46 
Credit reporting company’s investigation 867 14.33 
Improper use of my credit report 349 5.77 
Incorrect information on credit report 3,907 64.59 
Unable to get credit report/credit score 717 11.85 
Total 6,049 100 
 
   
                                                                                                                                         
 119.  This and the totals in the following tables equal exactly 100% when 
accounting for rounding error from the use of two digits. 
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Credit Card 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
APR or interest rate 2,235 10.17 
Advertising and marketing 498 2.27 
Application processing delay 134 0.61 
Arbitration 74 0.34 
Balance transfer 268 1.22 
Balance transfer fee 57 0.26 
Bankruptcy 97 0.44 
Billing disputes 3,467 15.78 
Billing statement 611 2.78 
Cash advance 75 0.34 
Cash advance fee 60 0.27 
Closing/Cancelling account 1,403 6.39 
Collection debt dispute 834 3.80 
Collection practices 938 4.27 
Convenience checks 38 0.17 
Credit card protection / Debt protection 792 3.61 
Credit determination 749 3.41 
Credit line increase/decrease 663 3.02 
Credit reporting 1,699 7.73 
Customer service / Customer relations 566 2.58 
Delinquent account 276 1.26 
Forbearance / Workout plans 201 0.92 
Identity theft / Fraud / Embezzlement 1,472 6.70 
Late fee 897 4.08 
Other 1,130 5.14 
Other fee 577 2.63 
Overlimit fee 64 0.29 
Payoff process 649 2.95 
Privacy 104 0.47 
Rewards 527 2.40 
Sale of account 55 0.25 
Transaction issue 486 2.21 
Unsolicited issuance of credit card 270 1.23 
Total 21,966 100 
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Money Transfers 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
Fraud or scam 6 17.14 
Incorrect/missing disclosures or info 1 2.86 
Money was not available when promised 9 25.71 
Other service issues 2 5.71 
Other transaction issues 15 42.86 
Wrong amount charged or received 2 5.71 
Total 35 100 
 
Mortgage 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
Application, originator, mortgage broke 3,898 6.68 
Credit decision / Underwriting 1,254 2.15 
Loan modification, collection, 
foreclosure 
34,785 59.58 
Loan servicing, payments, escrow 
account 
14,745 25.26 
Other 1,801 3.08 
Settlement process and costs 1,898 3.25 
Total 58,381 100 
 
Student Loan 
Issue Complaints Percentage 
Getting a loan 140 3.71 
Problems when you are unable to pay 1,125 29.81 
Repaying your loan 2,509 66.48 
Total 3,774 100 
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TABLE 3: COMPANY-SPECIFIC PROPORTION OF COMPLAINTS WITH 
UNTIMELY COMPANY RESPONSES  
Company Observations Percent 
Untimely
P-Value120 
Prudent Law Group 12 0.92 0.00 
Mercedes-Benz Financial 
Services 
12 0.58 0.00 
Statebridge Company 51 0.31 0.00 
Vantium Capital 21 0.24 0.04 
Quantum Servicing Company 18 0.22 0.07 
UMB Bank 33 0.21 0.01 
BancorpSouth Bank 19 0.21 0.07 
Residential Credit Solutions 115 0.18 0.00 
Regions 647 0.17 0.00 
Mortgage Investors 
Corporation 
41 0.17 0.02 
Amerisave 70 0.16 0.00 
Franklin Credit Management 27 0.15 0.09 
USAA Savings 491 0.14 0.00 
Morgan Stanley 65 0.14 0.01 
Bayview Loan Servicing, 
LLC 
183 0.08 0.01 
First Niagara Bank 170 0.08 0.01 
People’s United Bank 90 0.08 0.07 
OneWest Bank 1,147 0.07 0.00 
MetLife Bank 179 0.07 0.02 
                                                                                                                                         
 120. Here, the null hypothesis is that the company’s proportion of untimely 
responses is equal to the average proportion of untimely responses across all 
companies.  A low p-value indicates that the null hypothesis is statistically unlikely.  A 
p-value of 0.05 shows that there is a 1 in 20 chance of finding a value as or more 
extreme as the observed value given the null hypothesis.  A commonly used measure of 
a “low” p-value is one lower than 0.10 or 0.05 (hence the references to 10% 
significance and 5% significance). See generally DAVID MOORE, THE BASIC PRACTICE 
OF STATISTICS 371–77 (2009) (explaining hypothesis testing). 
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Carrington Mortgage 148 0.07 0.05 
Loan Care 95 0.07 0.08 
Bank of America 23,493 0.06 0.00 
Nationstar Mortgage 1,819 0.06 0.00 
M&T Bank 636 0.06 0.00 
Comerica 145 0.06 0.08 
PNC Bank 2,030 0.05 0.00 
Citibank 7,519 0.04 0.00 
 
Notes: The companies shown have a significantly higher proportion of 
untimely responses than average (defined at the 10% significance level).  
The table is sorted by proportion of untimely responses.  The final 
column shows the p-value from a test of the difference in the proportion 
of untimely responses from the average proportion of untimely 
responses.  Companies with fewer than 10 observations, after excluding 
“In Progress” complaints, were not tested. 
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TABLE 4: COMPANY-SPECIFIC PROPORTION OF COMPANY RESPONSES 
DISPUTED BY CONSUMER 
Company Observations Percent 
Disputed
P-
Value121 
BMW Financial Services 19 0.53 0.02 
Charles Schwab Bank 20 0.45 0.05 
Cash Call 50 0.40 0.01 
ChexSystems 39 0.38 0.04 
Banco Popular de Puerto 
Rico 
97 0.37 0.00 
Banco Popular North 
America 
45 0.36 0.06 
Santander Consumer USA  225 0.32 0.00 
State Farm Bank 75 0.32 0.05 
Toyota Motor Credit 
Corporation 
56 0.32 0.09 
Comerica 145 0.28 0.07 
Navy FCU 301 0.26 0.07 
The Huntington National 
Bank 
270 0.26 0.09 
Amex 1,439 0.25 0.00 
TD Bank 1,101 0.25 0.02 
Wells Fargo 14,476 0.24 0.00 
Ocwen 5,331 0.23 0.02 
Bank of America 23,493 0.22 0.01 
 
Notes: The companies shown have a significantly higher proportion of 
disputed complaints than average (defined at the 10% significance 
level). The table is sorted by proportion of disputed responses.  The final 
column shows the p-value from a test of the difference in the proportion 
of disputed responses from the average proportion of disputed 
responses.  Companies with fewer than 10 observations, after excluding 
“In Progress” complaints, were not tested.  
                                                                                                                                         
 121. See supra note 120. 
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TABLE 5: MORTGAGE COMPLAINTS PER MORTGAGE ORIGINATED, 
LARGEST BANKS 
Bank CFPB 
Mortgage 
Complaints* 
Number of 
2011 Mortgages 
Originated** 
Complaints per 
Mortgage 
Originated in 2011 
OneWest 
Bank 
1,113  4,507 0.247 
HSBC 1,402  15,720 0.089 
Nationstar 
Mortgage 
1,817  33,639 0.054 
Bank of 
America 
17,502  1.00E+06 0.017 
Citibank 2,706  189,222 0.014 
JPMorgan 
Chase 
5,805  1.00E+06 0.006 
SunTrust 
Bank 
1,038  184,056 0.006 
Wells Fargo 9,499  2.10E+06 0.004 
 
* Up to May 1, 2013 
** 2011 HMDA data 
Notes: The listed banks are those with the largest number of CFPB 
records. 
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TABLE 6: REGRESSIONS OF LOG OF MORTGAGE COMPLAINTS PER 
MORTGAGE ORIGINATED ON DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS OF ZIP CODE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Proportion Black 1.033*** 
(0.076) 
0.986*** 
(0.089) 
1.015*** 
(0.083) 
1.016*** 
(0.084) 
1.434*** 
(0.087) 
Proportion 
Hispanic 
0.745*** 
(0.162) 
0.867*** 
(0.178) 
0.346** 
(0.143) 
0.364** 
(0.146) 
0.696*** 
(0.150) 
      
Median Income 
(Blacks) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
      
Median Income 
(Hispanics) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
      
Median Income 
(All) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.056*** 
(0.012) 
-0.056*** 
(0.013) 
-0.032*** 
(0.012) 
      
Seniors 
(Proportion age 
65+) 
 1.316*** 
(0.260) 
1.052*** 
(0.260) 
1.069*** 
(0.264) 
0.810*** 
(0.232) 
      
Military 
Employment 
 3.790*** 
(0.602) 
3.705*** 
(0.656) 
3.734*** 
(0.661) 
1.293 
(0.858) 
      
College 
Enrollment 
 0.111 
(0.303) 
0.080 
(0.300) 
0.091 
(0.303) 
0.246 
(0.259) 
      
High School 
Graduates 
 0.040 
(0.458) 
1.520*** 
(0.402) 
1.561*** 
(0.405) 
1.623*** 
(0.335) 
      
College Graduates  0.818*** 
(0.284) 
1.682*** 
(0.242) 
1.708*** 
(0.245) 
1.792*** 
(0.230) 
      
Unemployment 
Rate 
 1.833*** 
(0.449) 
0.831* 
(0.464) 
0.881* 
(0.467) 
0.459 
(0.388) 
      
Number ISPs     -0.036*** 
(0.005) 
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Rural (RUCA 
score) 
    0.024*** 
(0.004) 
      
Foreclosure Risk 
Score 
    -0.743*** 
(0.088) 
      
Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y Y Y 
Company Fixed 
Effects 
   Y Y 
      
Observations 7863 7863 7863 7863 7580 
R-squared 0.187 0.213 0.322 0.331 0.339 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total number of mortgage 
complaints over number of households with a mortgage (as reported by 
the 2007-2011 American Community Survey Estimates) for ZCTAs 
with at least one complaint.  Dummies are included in all regressions for 
whether the income data for Blacks and Hispanics were available.  
Standard errors are clustered by state and company.  “In progress” 
responses, companies with less than 1 observations, and complaints 
lacking a state were excluded.  ISP, RUA score, and foreclosure risk 
score are averaged at the ZCTA level.  * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 7: LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF UNTIMELY RESPONSES ON ZIP 
CODE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Proportion Black 0.006 0.045 0.047 0.046 0.149 
 (0.172) (0.204) (0.143) (0.142) (0.169) 
      
Proportion 
Hispanic 
-0.042 
(0.331) 
0.055 
(0.288) 
0.194 
(0.161) 
0.279 
(0.178) 
0.236 
(0.188) 
 
Median Income 
(Blacks) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
 
Median Income 
(Hispanics) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
 
Median Income 
(All) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.028 
(0.021) 
 
Seniors 
(Proportion age 
65+) 
 0.476 
(0.888) 
0.565 
(0.452) 
0.636 
(0.430) 
0.580 
(0.443) 
  
Military 
Employment 
 0.211 
(0.818) 
0.390 
(0.739) 
0.012 
(0.852) 
-0.701 
(1.149) 
  
College 
Enrollment 
 1.265** 
(0.582) 
1.333*** 
(0.409) 
1.037** 
(0.428) 
1.028** 
(0.462) 
  
High School 
Graduates 
 1.202 
(1.640) 
1.532** 
(0.703) 
1.416** 
(0.714) 
1.374* 
(0.753) 
  
College 
Graduates 
 0.085 
(0.717) 
0.366 
(0.409) 
0.313 
(0.422) 
-0.017 
(0.488) 
  
Unemployment 
Rate 
 -0.901 
(1.233) 
-0.647 
(0.916) 
-0.217 
(0.951) 
-0.597 
(1.028) 
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Number ISPs     0.013 
     (0.009) 
      
Rural (RUCA 
score) 
    0.005 
(0.015) 
     
Foreclosure Risk 
Score 
    -0.134 
(0.150) 
     
PRODUCT      
Bank account or 
service 
-0.595*** 
(0.139) 
-0.596*** 
(0.137) 
-0.583*** 
(0.136) 
-0.483*** 
(0.109) 
-0.526*** 
(0.117) 
 
Consumer loan -0.326* -0.330* -0.322* 0.262 0.280 
 (0.197) (0.196) (0.191) (0.231) (0.233) 
      
Credit card -0.718*** -0.722*** -0.709*** -0.303** -0.345** 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.134) (0.144) (0.152) 
      
Credit reporting -2.977*** -2.976*** -2.985*** 0.376 0.502 
 (0.563) (0.563) (0.561) (0.757) (0.768) 
      
Student loan -1.565*** -1.575*** -1.575*** -0.058 -0.095 
 (0.278) (0.277) (0.273) (0.220) (0.231) 
      
Product / Issue 
Interactions 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed 
Effects 
  Y Y Y 
Company Fixed 
Effects 
   Y Y 
Observations 107270 107270 107270 95680 91719 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy for whether a complaint 
was resolved in an untimely fashion.  Standard errors are clustered by 
state and company.  As some ZIP codes have no Black or Hispanic 
residents, dummies are included in all regressions for whether income 
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data for blacks and Hispanics were available.  “In progress” responses, 
companies with less than 10 observations dropped, and complaints 
lacking a state were excluded. For the product and issue fixed effects, 
mortgages were the omitted product. See Table 9 for analysis of the 
issue fixed effects. Significance levels are denoted by * for the 10% 
level, ** for 5% level, and *** for the 1% level. 
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TABLE 8: LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF DISPUTED RESPONSES ON ZIP CODE 
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Proportion Black -0.140*** -0.078 -0.055 -0.068 -0.017 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.056) (0.056) (0.066) 
      
Proportion 
Hispanic 
-0.125** 
(0.055) 
-0.055 
(0.063) 
-0.056 
(0.070) 
-0.070 
(0.071) 
-0.062 
(0.074) 
 
Median Income 
(Blacks) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
Median Income 
(Hispanics) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
 
Median Income 
(All) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
 
Seniors 
(Proportion age 
65+) 
 0.463*** 
(0.166) 
0.787*** 
(0.191) 
0.773*** 
(0.191) 
0.690*** 
(0.209) 
  
Military 
Employment 
 0.259 
(0.256) 
0.225 
(0.269) 
0.191 
(0.268) 
0.714* 
(0.395) 
      
College 
Enrollment 
 -0.302 
(0.197) 
-0.184 
(0.215) 
-0.180 
(0.215) 
-0.163 
(0.223) 
  
High School 
Graduates 
 -0.439 
(0.325) 
0.196 
(0.356) 
0.203 
(0.359) 
0.101 
(0.377) 
  
College 
Graduates 
 0.254 
(0.181) 
0.569*** 
(0.197) 
0.557*** 
(0.198) 
0.449** 
(0.228) 
  
Unemployment 
Rate 
 0.064 
(0.299) 
0.150 
(0.354) 
0.180 
(0.358) 
0.223 
(0.383) 
  
Number ISPs     0.005 
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     (0.003) 
Rural (RUCA 
score) 
    0.016*** 
(0.006) 
     
Foreclosure Risk 
Score 
    -0.102* 
(0.060) 
     
PRODUCT      
Bank account or 
service 
-0.065* 
(0.036) 
-0.075** 
(0.036) 
-0.082** 
(0.036) 
-0.089** 
(0.038) 
-0.092** 
(0.037) 
 
Consumer loan -0.022 -0.023 -0.031 -0.123* -0.108 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073) (0.075) 
      
Credit card -0.223*** -0.231*** -0.236*** -0.195*** -0.182*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) 
      
Credit reporting -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.168*** -0.243 -0.261 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.204) (0.213) 
      
Money transfers 0.517 0.507 0.492 0.595 0.586 
 (0.600) (0.601) (0.597) (0.650) (0.650) 
      
Student loan -0.257*** -0.260*** -0.269*** -0.125 -0.147* 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.082) (0.083) 
      
Product / Issue 
Interactions 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed 
Effects 
  Y Y Y 
Company Fixed 
Effects 
   Y Y 
Observations 108610 108610 108610 108576 104090 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy variable for whether an 
individual complaint response was disputed.  Standard errors clustered 
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by state and company.  As some ZIP codes have no Black or Hispanic 
residents, dummies are included in all regressions for whether income 
data for blacks and Hispanics were available. “In progress” responses, 
companies with less than 10 observations, and complaints without a 
state were excluded.  For the product- and issue-fixed effects, mortgages 
were the omitted product. See Table 10 for analysis of the issue fixed 
effects. Significance levels are denoted by * for significance at the 10% 
level, ** for significance at the 5% level, and *** for significance at the 
1% level. 
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TABLE 9: PRODUCT BY ISSUE INTERACTIONS FROM TABLE 7: THE FIVE 
PRODUCT ISSUES MOST AND LEAST LIKELY TO BE UNTIMELY 
PRODUCT: ISSUE 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Being 
Untimely 
Coefficient 
from 
Specification in 
Table 7 
Least Likely to be Untimely   
Credit card: Payoff process 0.006 -1.397** 
  (0.578) 
   
Credit reporting: Credit reporting 
company’s investigation 
0.006 1.592 
(1.101) 
  
Consumer loan: Taking out the loan 
or lease 
0.009 -1.540* 
(0.792) 
  
Credit card: APR or interest rate 0.012 -0.550** 
  (0.239) 
   
Credit card: Credit determination 0.014 -0.424 
  (0.406) 
Most Likely to be Untimely   
Credit reporting: Improper use of 
my credit report 
0.042 0.954 
(1.312) 
  
Credit card: Identity theft / Fraud / 
Embezzlement 
0.044 0.625*** 
(0.197) 
  
Credit card: Arbitration 0.048 0.862 
  (0.867) 
   
Credit card: Sale of account 0.067 1.064* 
  (0.608) 
   
Consumer loan: Shopping for a line 
of credit 
0.071 0.620 
(0.610) 
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Notes: This table reports additional coefficients from Table 7, Column 
(5).  The first column here lists the product and issue, the second column 
shows the predicted probability of that issue being untimely from the 
specification in the final column of Table 7, and the third column shows 
the coefficient from the specification used in the final column of Table 
7.  The product/issue effects shown are those from Table 7 with the five 
highest and lowest predicted probabilities of being untimely. For the 
issues within each product, the analysis was conducted relative to the 
most numerous type of issue for each product: these were (i) bank 
account: account opening, closing, or management; (ii) consumer loan: 
managing the loan or lease; (iii) credit reporting: incorrect information 
on credit report; (iv) credit card: APR or interest rate; (v) money 
transfer: other transaction issues; (vi) mortgage: loan modification, 
collection, or foreclosure; (vii) student loan: repaying your loan. 
Significance levels are denoted by * for significance at the 10% level, 
** for significance at the 5% level, and *** for significance at the 1% 
level. 
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TABLE 10: PRODUCT BY ISSUE INTERACTIONS FROM TABLE 8: THE 
FIVE PRODUCT ISSUES MOST AND LEAST LIKELY TO BE DISPUTED 
PRODUCT: ISSUE 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Being Disputed 
Coefficient 
from Table 8 
Least Likely to be Disputed   
Credit card: Late fee 0.115 -0.623*** 
   (0.108) 
   
Credit reporting: Credit monitoring 
or identity protection 
0.131 -0.380* 
(0.204) 
   
Credit card: Cash advance fee 0.132 -0.582 
   (0.395) 
   
Credit card: Other fee 0.132 -0.514*** 
   (0.154) 
   
Credit card: Application processing 
delay 
0.134 -0.437 
(0.274) 
   
Most Likely to be Disputed   
Consumer loan: Taking out the 
loan or lease 
0.261 0.192 
(0.152) 
  
Credit card: Arbitration 0.261 0.364 
   (0.284) 
   
Credit card: Bankruptcy 0.302 0.579*** 
   (0.217) 
   
Credit card: Convenience checks 0.303 0.509 
   (0.393) 
   
Credit card: Cash advance 0.328 0.723*** 
   (0.270) 
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Notes: This table reports additional coefficients from Table 8, Column 
(5).  The first column here lists the product and issue, the second column 
shows the predicted probability of that issue being disputed from the 
specification in the final column of Table 8, and the third column shows 
the coefficient from the specification used in the final column of Table 
8. The product/issue effects shown are those from Table 8 with the five 
highest and lowest predicted probabilities of being disputed.  For the 
issues with each product, the following (most numerous type of issue for 
each product) are omitted: (i) Bank account, Account opening, closing, 
or management; (ii) Consumer loan: Managing the loan or lease; (iii) 
Credit Reporting: Incorrect information on credit report; (iv) Credit 
card: APR or interest rate; (v) Money transfer: Other transaction issues; 
(vi) Mortgage: Loan modification, collection, foreclosure; (vii) Student 
loan: Repaying your loan. Significance levels are denoted by * for 
significance at the 10% level, ** for significance at the 5% level, and 
*** for significance at the 1% level. 
